Author: Laura Dell'Antonio
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), supplements the 1925 Geneva Protocol and inspired much hope when it first came into force in 1975. Countries agreed not to develop, stockpile, produce, or acquire biological agents and toxins except for protective or peaceful purposes and to destroy any current biological weapons stockpiles. Currently, the Convention has 183 state-parties (including Palestine) and four signatories.
Due to the nature of biological agents, BWC-compliance is challenging to verify. Bacteria and viruses occur naturally and can be quickly cultivated in a laboratory. Usage of some of these agents is also necessary for research as well as vaccine and treatment development. At the Second Review Conference in 1986, confidence-building measures (CBM) were introduced to establish increased transparency between the parties. Parties now had to report activity in high biosafety level laboratories, biodefence programs, human vaccine production facilities, and documentation on legislation for implementing BWC nationally. Although the number of countries submitting CBM reports has increased, in 2020, it was only 84 parties who did (the highest number ever submitted).
One significant difference between the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, is that the CWC has an implementing body, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), part of which is the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). The SAB reports on developments in science and technology and provides advice on technical matters related to the Convention and its implementation. It is comprised of 25 experts from OPCW member states; however, they do not represent their respective governments but instead act in a personal capacity. The SAB is also responsible for liaising with other experts and forming working groups to assess and report specific issues relevant to the CWC. Although the nature of biological weapons poses a more difficult arms control challenge due to the dual-use challenge, the quantities needed to cause harm and the time needed to convert legitimate production facilities for prohibited use, I still believe having an SAB is crucial.
The lack of an SAB for the BWC sends the wrong message to the nations that signed the treaty and also to those that have not. The BWC and CWC have and will always be compared due to the ways in which they are similar; therefore, the CWC having an implementing body and a Scientific Advisory Board suggests that chemical weapons are of higher importance and pose a more significant threat to other nations and humanity in general. Furthermore, having individuals who can advise on technical advances in a rapidly evolving field allows for better progress and better analysis of situations. An SAB would also result in the Convention no longer needing to rely on member states for submissions for science and technology reviews, which has only been carried out by a handful of parties. Lastly, the addition of an SAB would provide a more impartial and knowledgeable group of individuals who can accurately assess possible non-compliance.
Although an implementing body has not yet been established, which would most likely come with the formation of an SAB, I am very hopeful that it will occur in the next couple of years. Several countries have commented on the weakness of the BWC and have made an effort to strengthen it. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has shed light on the threat associated with biological agents, both naturally occurring and weaponized, hopefully drawing attention to the BWC and the important work it does.
This article was prepared by the author in their personal capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the view of their place of employment.
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